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a b s t r a c t
The academic literature has traditionally framed corruption as a principal-agent problem, but recently
scholars have suggested that the phenomenon may be more accurately described as a collective action
problem, especially in cases of systemic and widespread corruption. While framing corruption as a col-
lective action problem has proven useful from a descriptive point of view, it has not offered many helpful
suggestions for policy reforms. This paper tries to address this gap by suggesting that “institutional mul-
tiplicity” (a concept used other areas of research but not in the corruption literature) could be a feasible
reform strategy to deal with corruption as a collective action problem. The paper distinguishes between
proactive and reactive institutional multiplicity, and argues that the latter’s creation of separate insti-
tutions could potentially reduce the costs for those who are inclined to engage in principled behavior
to deviate from the standard corrupt behavior that prevails in society. This allows for incremental, but
potentially very transformative change. Also, institutional multiplicity allows for the creation of new
institutions without dismantling the existing ones. It is therefore less likely to face political resistance
from interestswhobeneﬁt fromthe status quo.Weprovide someanecdotal evidence to support this claim
by analyzing Brazil’s recent surge of anti-corruption efforts which could be, at least in part, attributable
to the existence of institutional multiplicity in the country’s accountability system. In addition to offer-
ing a hypothesis to interpret recent experiences with combating corruption in Brazil, the paper also has
broader implications: if the hypothesis proves correct, institutional multiplicity could help reformers in
other countries where corruption is systemic.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Initiatives to combat corruption have generally focused on
individuals, changing their roles, decisions, or incentives.Most anti-
corruption programs follow the theoretical frameworks embraced
by conventional criminal deterrence and punishment regimes
which seek to prevent and redress the societal harms caused by
criminal activity by targeting the conduct of individual actors;
speciﬁcally, drawingon the rational actor andprincipal-agentmod-
els of decision-making, tactics generally focuson raising the costs of
misconduct while reducing opportunities for individuals to engage
in such illicit activities (Becker, 1962;Cooter&Ulen, 2012;Garoupa,
2003).
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In contrast, a growing body of literature conceptualizes corrup-
tion as a collective action problem (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson,
Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; Sánchez, 2015). As such, an individual
may rationally choose to engage in corrupt behavior in a context
in which a signiﬁcant number of other individuals are also acting
corruptly. While this literature has shed a great deal of light on
the phenomenon, especially in contexts where corruption is sys-
temic, it has been largely underdeveloped with regard to strategies
to combat corruption effectively. In an attempt to ﬁll in this gap,
this article suggests that institutional multiplicity in an account-
ability system may be an effective strategy to address corruption
as a collective action problem.
Section 1 of the article begins by presenting the dominant the-
oretical lens through which corruption has conventionally been
viewed, the principal-agent model, and examines its limitations.
Section 2 introduces more recent literature suggesting that the
collective action model may provide a more accurate explana-
tion for the ways in which corruption arises and persists within
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2016.07.009
1062-9769/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Table 1
Examples of principal-agent relationships.
Principal Agent
Electorate Elected ofﬁcials
Elected ofﬁcials High-ranking bureaucrats
High-ranking bureaucrats Low-ranking bureaucrats, subordinates
Corporate shareholders Corporate directors, executives
Corporate directors Corporate managers
Corporate managers Subordinate employees
Compiled by the authors.
organizations and societies and reviews the (limited) scholarship
on the performance of anti-corruption projects and policies ori-
ented around that approach. Section 3 imports the concept of
institutionalmultiplicity fromother areas of research, and suggests
it could serve as a mechanism to combat corruption as it addresses
both the collective and the individual factors that may encourage
(or, at least do not prevent) individuals to act corruptly. Section 4
focuses on recent developments in Brazil’s anti-corruption efforts
to illustrate the potential effectiveness of institutional multiplicity
in battling this pernicious phenomenon, while Section 5 concludes.
2. Corruption as a principal-agent problem
For decades, the principal-agent (P-A) model has provided the
theoretical basis for much of the research on corruption, and
has informed the design and implementation of most contempo-
rary anti-corruption initiatives (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Lawson,
2009; Rothstein, 2011). In a 2011 meta-analysis of 115 studies
examining corruption’s impacts on economic growth, Ugur and
Dasgupta found that every study “adhered to an explicitly stated
principal-agent approach to corruption” or was “closely related to
that approach” (2011: 43).
2.1. The principal-agent model of corruption
As described in the broader economics and political science
literature, a principal-agent problem arises when a Principal (P)
requires the services of an Agent (A) but lacks the information nec-
essary to oversee A’s performance effectively. Closely associated
with the work of Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard (1988), the
P-A model explains corruption as the result when P is unable to
monitor A adequately, and A exploits that information asymmetry
to betray P’s interests in pursuit of her1 own (Andvig & Fjeldstad,
2001; DFID, 2015). For example, in a situation involving the embez-
zlement of public funds by an elected ofﬁcial, the ofﬁcial would
represent the corrupt A while the citizenry would be the wronged
and poorly informed P. Table 1 provides examples of other possible
P-A relationships:
However, the P-A model of corruption is based on several core
assumptions that may not hold true across a variety of contexts.
First, the framework assumes a divergence in the motivations and
objectives of P and A, namely that P is a “principled,” benevo-
lent principal while A is a self-interested agent (Klitgaard, 1988).
Given the common deﬁnition of corruption as the “misuse of
entrusted power for private beneﬁt” (OECD, 2008; Transparency
International, 2015), in situations inwhichcorruptionhasoccurred,
the inference that some actor (such as an A) has abused her posi-
tion to self-interested ends may generally go unchallenged, but the
assumption that P is principled deserves further scrutiny. Partic-
ularly in environments in which corruption has become endemic,
there may be a notable lack of such benevolent principals (Booth &
1 For the sake of consistency, throughout this article we use feminine pronouns,
but all such references should be considered effectively gender-neutral.
Cammack, 2013; Persson et al., 2013). For instance, in government
bureaucracies dominated by patronage networks, political elites
who are able to derive rents from the corrupt behaviors of their
subordinates may face weak incentives to expose or punish the
misconduct of those underlings and may in fact actively endeavor
to maintain and protect corrupted systems (Johnston, 2005).
Second and relatedly, the supposition that Ps would hold As
accountable if only they possessed adequate information about
those agents’ activities has not been supported consistently by
empirical or anecdotal evidence. For example, the P-A framework
would expect the citizenry in a democracy to vote out of ofﬁce
politicians whose corrupt behaviors have been publicly exposed.
In reality, however, “there are numerous examples of how vot-
ers fail to replace their corrupt politicians and, in some countries,
this seems to be the rule rather than the exception,” particularly in
countries characterizedbyweakor clientelisticdemocratic systems
(Søreide, 2014: 38). Policy or political concerns beyond corruption
(Manzetti & Wilson, 2006; Rundquist, Strom, & Peters, 1977), a lack
of non-corrupt alternatives (Caselli & Morelli, 2004; Kurer, 2001;
Messner & Polborn, 2004), or even the rules and the structure of the
electoral system itself (Kunicova&Rose-Ackerman, 2005;Myerson,
1993; Persson, Tabellini, & Trebbi, 2003) may explain this seem-
ingly irrational reluctance of voters to punish corrupt ofﬁcials at
the ballot box.
Finally, even if P-A theory accurately describes the way cor-
ruption functions in a given environment–i.e., Ps are principled
and would hold corrupt As accountable if possessed of ade-
quate knowledge–theproblemof informationasymmetries and the
imbalances of power they create persist. Even if systems could be
designed to heighten the ability of Ps to monitor and oversee the
behaviors of their As, that information will never be perfect due to
recognized human cognitive limitations related to the gathering,
processing, and retaining of information (Bobonis, Cámara Fuertes,
& Schwabe, 2015; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998; Simon, 1955).
2.2. The limitations of conventional anti-corruption initiatives
Reﬂecting the dominance of the P-A model in corruption
scholarship, conventional anti-corruption reforms have typically
focusedonchanging the incentives facingpotentially corrupt actors
and better aligning the interests of agents with their principals.
Such policies and interventions often include creating or strength-
ening mechanisms that allow Ps to monitor and sanction their As,
increasing overall organizational transparency, and reducing the
level of discretion exercised by low-level bureaucrats and employ-
ees (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; UNDP,
2004).
While the growing prominence of corruption on the global
development agenda over the past few decades has resulted in the
widespread adoption of such reform strategies in countries around
the world, to date, evidence on the impact and success of these ini-
tiatives has been notably underwhelming (Doig, Watt, & Williams,
2007; Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011). In fact,
meta-analysesof studiesonvariousanti-corruption initiatives indi-
cate that the evidence of their efﬁcacy is generally weak or, at best,
fair, with medium-to-strong evidence of effectiveness found only
with public ﬁnancial management reforms, such as public expen-
diture tracking systems (PETS) (DFID, 2015: 84; Johnson, Taxell, &
Zaum, 2012: 41).
The disappointing results of anti-corruption initiatives based
on the incentive-oriented P-A approach appear, in some cases,
attributable to the framework’s often-inaccurate assumptions,
described in the previous section. For instance, in many
countries, there may be a dearth of principled stakeholders will-
ing to implement and enforce effective disclosure, monitoring,
investigating, and sanctioning policies and laws (Amundsen, 2006;
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Booth & Cammack, 2013; Persson et al., 2013). While political lead-
ers may publicly endorse reforms, the true political will to combat
corruption in many countries is partial, non-existent, or inconsis-
tent (Hatchard, 2014: 28–33; Williams & Doig, 2007). Even more
troubling, in somecountries, anti-corruptionpolicies andprograms
have been used to eliminate or discourage political or economic
rivals, consolidate and maintain existing systems of power and
patronage, and perpetuate corruption, especially at the elite or
“grand” levels (Huther & Anwar, 2000; Lawson, 2009).
Although some individuals may actively work against reforms,
a more pervasive challenge appears to be the general passivity of
leaders and citizens in many thoroughly corrupt countries to take
action to change the existing systems and dynamics. For example,
while public protests against abusive and dishonest governments
have raged in countries across the globe in recent years, survey
data indicates that, in the course of their daily lives, many individ-
uals are complicit in maintaining and perpetuating corruption in
their countries (Persson et al., 2013; Smith, 2008). In a 2013 poll of
citizens from 107 countries, a third of respondents admitted that
they had paid a bribe to a public ofﬁcial, while over 30% declared
that they would be unwilling to report an incident of corruption to
authorities, civil society, or the media (Transparency International,
2013). The demonstratedwillingness of voters inmany countries to
reelect politicianswho have been implicated publicly in corruption
scandals further conﬁrms that transparency initiatives that merely
increase the amount of information Ps have about the activities of
their As may be insufﬁcient to change the actual behaviors of the
stakeholders involved (Rundquist et al., 1977).
While this section surveyed the theoretical and empirical limi-
tations of the principal-agent approaches to corruption, it does not
conclude that the theory and the initiatives it has informed should
be abandoned summarily. In reality, corruption often manifests as
both a principal-agent and, as we discuss in the next section, as a
collective action problem. Thus, each framework may provide use-
ful and actionable insights into how the phenomenon arises and
endures within a given environment. As such, “the question is not
about choosing one or the other conceptual interpretations of cor-
ruption, but rather about identifying the contexts/settings where
each of these perspectives is likely to be analytically most useful in
relation to exploring corruption” (DFID, 2015: 14, citing Marquette
& Peiffer, 2014).
3. Corruption as a collective action problem
3.1. The collective action approach to corruption
Given the limitations of the P-A model and its imperfect
assumptions regarding the incentives and motives (and ultimate
behaviors) of relevant stakeholders, an emerging body of scholar-
ship has advocated for a shift in the way in which we conceptualize
corruption and explain its emergence and persistence within and
across societies. This literature argues that, especially in thor-
oughly corrupt environments, corruption more closely resembles
a collective action problem rather than a principal-agent problem
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Sánchez, 2015).
A collective action problem arises in a group setting when a
strategy that is individually rational produces an outcome that is
collectively inferior; for example,while society as awholewouldbe
better off if everyone cooperated by behaving honestly, an individ-
ualmaybeneﬁt personally by defecting and engaging in corruption.
While in some situations, such as “prisoners’ dilemma” or “free
rider” settings, the optimal individual strategy will always be to
defect rather than cooperate, in others, the ways in which stake-
holders seek to maximize their individual interests are based on
shared expectations about the behaviors of others (Medina, 2007;
Ostrom, 1998). Corruption often emerges as a collective action
problem of this latter type, and the perceived prevalence of corrup-
tion within a given environment can have a deterministic effect on
individuals’ decisions concerning their own behavior. Speciﬁcally,
if you expect others in your community to be corrupt, you will be
incentivized to act corruptly because the individual costs of engag-
ing in principled behaviors outweigh the individual beneﬁts. Even
an individual who would prefer to act honestly may see no other
choice but to behave corruptlywhen operating in a thoroughly cor-
rupt environment; under such conditions, the costs of principled
behaviors can include ostracism, ridicule, stigmatization, or retri-
bution (e.g., loss of employment or even life) by or at the behest of
other members of the community.
Furthermore, while the costs of refraining from corrupt prac-
tices in systemically corrupt settings may be high, the beneﬁts
are likely to be low, especially if those dissenters lack sufﬁ-
cient numbers or inﬂuence to create meaningful, systemic change
through their honest behaviors (Rothstein, 2011: 99). Confronted
by such disincentives, even intrinsically honest individuals are
likely to be deterred from deviating from the dominant–and
corrupt–institutional modus operandi (Booth, 2012; DFID, 2015).
The collective action approach thus helps to explain how soci-
eties canbecome trapped in sub-optimal, self-reinforcingequilibria
in which individuals engage in corruption because they expect
everyone else to be corrupt, behaviors which then further fuel
those negative collective expectations (Bardhan, 1997). Signiﬁ-
cantly, these patterns of beliefs and behaviors can hold even in
situations in which a vast majority of people condemns corrup-
tion and realizes that a less-corrupt outcome would be better for
society at large (Persson et al., 2013).
Moreover, even in settings in which all parties would beneﬁt
from the establishment of rules or institutions that would shift
the society to a less corrupt equilibria, participants are likely to
disagree on the form and content of such reforms. As such, the
introduction of anti-corruption initiatives can present a “second
order” collective action dilemma (Ostrom, 1998; Rothstein, 2011).
The collective action framework thus helps to elucidate why so
many countries have struggled to establish and maintain strong,
legitimate accountability institutions–“constructing such institu-
tions is in itself a problem of collective action that is not likely to be
solved within a society dominated by corrupt agents” (Rothstein,
2011: 105). These “second order” collective action problems also
reveal how rules and initiatives aimed at altering the dynamics
of the system could be manipulated. For instance, political elites
(including traditional principals such as elected ofﬁcials, high-level
bureaucrats, and supervisors) often stand to gain the most from
rents associated with corruption and thus have minimal incen-
tives to change the system. Thus, when confrontedwith potentially
promising reform strategies those stakeholders may actively and
persuasively mobilize against them.
3.2. Incorporating the collective action framework into
anti-corruption programming
While the collective action framework helps to explain why
so few of the anti-corruption initiatives based on the P-A model
have proven successful, to date, the literature on how the collective
action approach can and shouldbe incorporated into thedesign and
implementation of more effective reforms to combat corruption
has been limited. The framework does suggest that anti-corruption
initiatives should focus on changing informal rules and norms. Peo-
ple will be unlikely to embrace reform, so long as they believe
that the fundamental character of their society (“the rules of the
game”) remains unchanged. Thus, in order to shift a highly corrupt
society to a lower-corruption equilibrium, formal monitoring and
sanctioningmechanismsmust be complemented by initiatives that
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help to build expectations among the citizenry and leadership that
values such as trust, reciprocity, honesty, and accountability are
collectively shared and supported (Ostrom, 1990, 1998; Persson
et al., 2013; Uslaner, 2008).
However, the challenges involved in intentionally and purpose-
fully changing informal rules and norms are well-documented
(Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007; North, 2005). Anecdotal
evidence from the few countries that have managed to transi-
tion from high levels of corruption to less corrupt systems (e.g.,
Hong Kong, Singapore) suggests that one potentially promising
strategy may lie in ﬁnding or cultivating leaders willing to ﬁght
corruption through their own honest action, not mere rhetoric
(Recantini, 2011; Rothstein, 2011: 204). However, the recognition
that meaningful cultural change can, in some cases, be effected
from above provides no guidance on how to encourage lead-
ers to take such steadfast and personal stands against corruption
in their societies. Moreover, absent the support of the broader,
decentralized sets of agents to implement and facilitate their
reforms, individual elite “champions” may be unable to achieve
such profound institutional or normative changes (Andrews,
2013).
The collective action framework also recognizes that shifts in
the informal rules and norms related to corruption may require
broad, all-encompassing reforms rather than small, piecemeal
initiatives (Sánchez, 2015). Citing the historical experiences of
Sweden, Denmark, and the United States, for instance, Rothstein
(2011) argues thatminor reforms are unlikely to foment the radical
change in expectations thatmaybe required tomove a society from
a culture of particularism and patronage to one of universalism
and impartiality. Instead, he advocates for an “indirect ‘big bang’
approach” to institutional change in order tomove a country to and
beyond a critical “tipping point” where a lower corruption equi-
librium can be reached and sustained (Ibid: 118–119). However,
while such radical overhauls may be desirable in theory, in real-
ity self-reinforcing mechanisms generally frustrate major changes
by generating signiﬁcant stakeholder resistance and increasing
switching costs that “lock in” institutional arrangements. Due
to path dependence, large-scale, comprehensive approaches are
unlikely to be feasible during normal times and may only arise
as realistic options for reformers during rare and unpredictable
periods known as “critical junctures” (Pierson, 2000; Prado &
Trebilcock, 2009).
Given the high risks and costs facing “ﬁrst movers” who oppose
corruption in the face of both entrenched, corrupt interests and
popular apathyor complicity, reformcoalitionshavebeenendorsed
as a promising change strategy (Chene, 2010; Johnston & Kpundeh,
2004: 3–4; Klitgaard & Baser, 1998). Reform coalitions typically
bring together diverse constituencies of often-elite actors within
and outside of the state in order to take coordinated, multi-faceted
actions to advance shared objectives, such as controlling cor-
ruption (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015). While coalitions may prove
useful in rapidly launching visible, credible reform movements
and mobilizing resources, it is not clear that they are immune
from the problems of ﬁnding “leaders and champions”, which are
often essential in early stages of the coalition building process
(Johnston & Kpundeh, 2004: 15–16). Moreover, endurance of such
coordinated groups may prove challenging, especially when the
constituencies best-positioned to support anti-corruption initia-
tives are geographically dispersed or represent dissimilar or even
clashing political, economic, or social identities as illustrated by
the cases of Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore
Agenda Task Force in the Karnataka State in India (Johnston &
Kpundeh, 2004).
Collective action and path dependence theories also help to
explain the staunch resistance reforms aimed at improving the
performance of existing anti-corruption authorities (ACAs) often
encounter. Reforms that affect the authority, resources, structure,
or other characteristics of an ACA are not enacted on an institu-
tional tabula rasa, and while the beneﬁts of such changes may be
broad anddispersed, the interests that they arguably threaten, such
as the current organizational leadership or external parties who
beneﬁt from sub-optimal corruption regulation, are likely to be
concentrated and intense.
In conclusion, while the collective action approach offers valu-
able insights into how societal factors affect individuals’ decisions
and behaviors aswell aswhy conventional anti-corruption reforms
have achieved such unimpressive performance records, the policy
recommendations based on that framework are generally vague
and often unfeasible.
4. Institutional multiplicity – a promising approach to
addressing corruption as a collective action problem
4.1. Deﬁning institutional multiplicity
Institutional multiplicity is a concept that has long been used
in organizational theory to explore the existence of more than one
institutional arrangement or option, within a certain institutional
ﬁeld (Scott, 1994). In this literature, the concept has often been
associated with arrangements that may facilitated change of indi-
viduals’ choices, behaviors, and even further institutional change
(Clemens & Cook, 1999: 446; Seo & Creed, 2002).
However, there is no certainty about how these multiple insti-
tutions will interact with each other (Weijer, 2013). In global
governance, for example, institutional multiplicity has generated a
ﬁerce debate aboutwhether the proliferation of international insti-
tutions has generated productive overlap and positive competition
or whether it solely the cause of costly conﬂict and wasteful dupli-
cation of functions (Ivanova&Roy, 2007). In the case of failed states
institutional multiplicity operates as an obstacle to state building
efforts, as it creates “a situation in which different sets of rules of
the game, often contradictory, coexist in the same territory, putting
citizens and economic agents in complex, often unsolvable, situa-
tions, but at the sametimeoffering themthepossibilityof switching
strategically from one institutional universe to another.” (Di John,
2008: 33–34).
Only recently institutional multiplicity has been proposed as a
useful concept for the literature on corruption (Prado & Carson,
2016; Prado, Carson, & Correa, 2016). The accountability process
involves three core stages: (1) oversight/monitoring to identify
potential corruption, (2) investigation of suspected corruption, and
(3) punishment in cases where there is sufﬁcient evidence that
corruption has occurred (Power & Taylor, 2011). In this context,
institutional multiplicity describes any diversiﬁcation of institu-
tions performing one particular function, such as the simultaneous
existence of multiple forms of punishment and different sanc-
tions that reinforce each other. For example, in cases involving
political corruption, offenders may face a series of overlapping
penalties, including electoral sanctions from the public at the
ballot box, political sanctions such as censure or administrative
removal fromofﬁce, and reputational damage fromnegativemedia
coverage, in addition to formal legal sanctions, such as criminal
or civil judgments. The assumption is that the overlap of insti-
tutional functions can enhance the overall effectiveness of the
“web” of accountability institutions by avoiding self-reinforcing
mechanisms or corrupt institutional cultures. While there is
not guarantee of a particular outcome, multiplicity may help
combat corruption by fostering institutional competition, collab-
oration, complementarity, and compensation (Prado & Carson,
2016).
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An example of institutional multiplicity can be found in Brazil’s
Clean Company Act (Law n. 12,846/132), enacted in August 2013
and in force since January 2014. The Act establishes, for the ﬁrst
time, corporate liability for corruption and other “acts committed
against the domestic or foreign public administration” (Art. 1), and
it creates a parallel system of accountability processes that may
culminate in administrative sanctions for legal entities that are dif-
ferent fromand independentof sanctions imposedbycourts (Prado,
Carson, & Correa, 2016). The potential administrative penalties for
violations of theCleanCompanyAct includeﬁnes ranging from0.1%
to 20% of the violating ﬁrm’s gross revenues (Art. 6) as well as pub-
lication of the sanctioning decision. In contrast, the civil penalties
that the judiciarymay impose include disgorgement of the beneﬁts
sought or obtained by the illegal act, suspension or partial inter-
ruption of the company’s activities, exclusion from government
funding and assistance (e.g., subsidies, grants, loans, donations) for
one to ﬁve years, and, in extreme cases, dissolution of the legal
entity (Art. 19). Thus, the administrative penalties provided under
the Act coexist with civil or other judicially imposed sanctions
creating institutional multiplicity in punishment for corruption in
Brazil.
While the application of this concept to the analysis of anti-
corruption measures has been proposed in the literature, the
mechanisms that allow institutional multiplicity to be an effective
tool in the ﬁght against corruption have not been articulated yet.
4.2. Institutional multiplicity as a strategy to address collective
action problems
As described in section 2, the collective action framework indi-
cates that one of the core challenges in ﬁghting corruption is
overcoming the second order collective action problem, i.e. the fact
that those in positions of power who beneﬁt from the status quo
generally have little to no incentive to change the rules of the game
and may even actively undercut such reforms. The concept of insti-
tutional multiplicity offers a possible strategy for overtaking these
entrenched barriers to institutional change because it does not rely
onoutright andabrupt institutionaldisplacement–the replacement
of one institution by a new one. In the short term, institutional
multiplicity leave intact existing institutions and merely provide
alternative paths for achieving the same or similar objectives.
While it may avoid generating intense political resistance from
stakeholders invested in existing institutions, institutional multi-
plicity does rely on a core assumption, namely that there exists
at least one individual in the society who is interested in cur-
tailing corruption and able to change the rules of the game. It
is unclear where such actors may be found or how they can
be produced, but, unlike the “champion”-oriented anti-corruption
model, potential reformers are not limited to very prominent lead-
ers or other particularly inﬂuential and powerful elites. Rather,
institutional multiplicity offers a mechanism through which any
reform-oriented individual who is capable of affecting the content,
administration, or enforcement of existing rules, at any level, may
escape her present institutional environment for one more recep-
tive to reform. Thus, the framework does not depend on the ability
of this individual to convinceothers, effect signiﬁcant social change,
or inﬂuence large groups, as required by most mechanisms sug-
gested by the collective action framework. Moreover, while relying
on the existence of such an actor, institutionalmultiplicity does not
2 While the statute is known in Portuguese as Lei Anti-Corrupc¸ão, the English lan-
guage literature generally refers to the statute as the Clean Company Act, which
better captures the fact that the statute is mostly focused on punishing companies
for bribing government ofﬁcials.
assume anything about her motivations. Whether benevolent or
self-interested, the actormust simply bewilling towork for change.
Institutionalmultiplicity avoidsmanyof the challenges that face
other policy recommendations informed by the collective action
framework. First, it tackles that issue of formal and informal rules
and norms. While institutional multiplicity itself represents a for-
mal structural change, the creation or existence of alternative
institutional paths can also generate external contradictions that
in turn destabilize existing regularities of action. Thus, it may lead
to meaningful changes in collective expectations. For example, the
accepted behavioral regularities observed in one institutionmay be
challenged by contradictory behavioral patterns observed within
another institution (Clemens&Cook, 1999: 446; Seo&Creed, 2002;
Zilber, 2011).
Second, institutional multiplicity requires neither a big bang
approach nor “key” (but unspeciﬁed) small changes. Indeed, insti-
tutional multiplicity may be created by a variety of circumstances.
In some cases, multiplicity is generated unintentionally as a result
of processes of variability among independent systems, nesting
of subordinated (but yet somewhat autonomous) systems within
higher orders, or residue for institutions that have been eliminated
but left an imprint in the system (Zilber, 2011:1540). In other cases,
the creation of multiplicity may be intentional, as reformers may
want to explore the possibility of establishing competing institu-
tional jurisdictions. In any of these cases, the sheer presence of
multiple institutional referents “enlarges the toolbox from which
reformers can draw in crafting new solutions, facilitating deeper
change” (Andrews, 2013: 182, citing Ostrom, 2008). Institutional
multiplicity alsoallows reformers toobserve thesemultipleoptions
in action to assess their relative effectiveness.
Third, institutional multiplicity can help anti-corruption
reforms coalitions to coalesce and unify. While champions and
supporters of anti-corruption policies may be initially dispersed
across branches and levels of government, the creation of new
institutions allows proponents of change to identify allies and also
facilitates their organization into alliances that can mobilize for
further reforms.
In sum, institutionalmultiplicitynotonly addresses corruption’s
second order collective action problem but also avoids many of the
shortcomings that characterize existing reform proposals based on
the collective action framework.
4.3. Types of institutional multiplicity
Institutional multiplicity can combat corruption by limiting
opportunities for corruption (proactive institutional multiplicity)
or by increasing the likelihood of catching and sanctioning corrupt
behavior (reactive institutional multiplicity).
Examples of proactive institutional multiplicity to reduce
opportunities for corruption include the elimination ofmonopolies
in the provision of services. For example, Rose-Ackerman (1978)
has argued that multiple ofﬁcials should be granted the authority
to issue a given license or provide another service so that a pri-
vate party who is solicited for a bribe by one agent can simply turn
to another to secure the service honestly. While intuitively com-
pelling, this strategy assumes that public ofﬁcials are corrupt while
thosewhodemandgovernment services areprincipled.However, if
the assumptions are reversed, institutional competition can actu-
ally create more opportunities for corruption: if I want to obtain
a license for which I am not qualiﬁed, having multiple ofﬁcials to
approach with a bribe, rather than one, may increase the chance
that I will be successful in my dishonest endeavor (Bardhan, 1997).
Institutional multiplicity is also subject to several other quali-
ﬁcations. First, there is a risk of unintended consequences: while
competing jurisdictions may decrease bribes, it can increase the
amount of total theft from the government (Shleifer & Vishny,
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1993). Second, the implementation of an effective system of insti-
tutional multiplicity depends on the possibility of establishing
competing jurisdictions, which may not be possible due to limited
resources or depending on the type of service delivered. Third, if
institutional multiplicity merely facilitates shirking by one or more
employees or agencies instead of creating incentives for improved
performance, it will be ineffective in helping to curtail corruption
and may simply waste resources (Bardhan, 1997).
Institutional multiplicity as a reactive tool for combatting cor-
ruption, in turn, involves generating alternative avenues through
which authorities may monitor, investigate, and punish corrup-
tion. The ability ofmultiple institutions tomonitor, investigate, and
pursue administrative, civil, and criminal charges based on suspi-
cions or detected irregularities increases the likelihood that those
engaged in corruption will be held accountable.
5. Brazil: a case study of reactive institutional multiplicity
Brazil offers an interesting example of systemic corruption as
a collective action problem. There are high levels of social dis-
trust in the country, and strong perceptions that elites are corrupt
(Carson & Prado, 2014). Many of the most notorious corruption
scandals in Brazil over the past few decades have involved top-
level ofﬁcials or other politicians using public funds to shore up
political support (Cardoso’s vote-buying scandal, Mensalão, Petro-
brás) and/or receiving illegal payments from the private sector or
citizens in exchange for favorable treatment (Collorgate, Budget
Dwarves, Operation Anaconda, Operation Bloodsuckers, Petrobrás)
(Ibid.). In the former category of cases, existing (and prospective)
political leaders have an interest in maintaining the status quo,
while in the latter, both bribe-taking ofﬁcials and bribe-paying pri-
vate businesses and individuals are incentivized to resist change.
These numerous scandals not only conﬁrm the popular perception
that corruption is endemic at the top levels of the country’s busi-
ness sector and political system, but also reinforce the collective
expectation thatefforts against corruptionwill not succeedand that
individuals and companies, especially those in positions of power,
will continue to engage in corrupt activities with impunity.
Details from two of the most recent scandal reveal how these
negative feedback loops between elite behaviors and collective
expectationshave entrenched corruption inBrazil.While observers
might have expected members of the opposition PSDB to call for
ofﬁcials from the governing party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) to
be held politically and legally accountable for their corrupt behav-
iors in the Mensalão (“big monthly stipend”) scandal (Michener,
2012; The Economist, 2013), the involvement of their own PSDB
colleagues in a similar scheme (“mensalão mineiro”) vastly reduced
their incentives to combat wrongdoing and may even have unex-
pectedly aligned the interests of the two parties to moderate their
condemnation of and public outcry against the elected and party
ofﬁcials allegedly involved (Bresciani, 2013).
The recent Petrobrás scandal involves alleged malfeasance by
corporate, as well as political, elites. The evidence suggests that
the ruling coalition received hundreds of millions (if not billions)
of dollars in kickbacks from overpriced contracts awarded by the
state-owned oil company, in an elaborated scheme of illegal cam-
paign ﬁnancing. Many of the directors who managed the bidding
processes through which these inﬂated contracts were awarded
were themselves nominated to their positions by the parties in the
ruling coalition, suggesting that these individuals may have been
appointedbasedon theirwillingness toparticipate inor at least tac-
itly condone the scheme. Many of the companies beneﬁting from
the scheme would not be able to survive (or to keep sizable oper-
ations in Brazil), if it was not for the contracts with Petrobrás. In
sum, the corrupt operation endured because none of the involved
individuals or companies saw an advantage in taking action against
it (Costas, 2014).
Focusing on Brazilian citizens’ responses to these scandals, the
implicit question is whether, consistent with the principal-agent
framework, the electorate will hold corrupt politicians account-
able by voting them out of ofﬁce. The evidence, however, is not
very reassuring. Both hypothetical and ﬁeld experiments show
that Brazilian voters are unlikely to change their choice of can-
didate, even after receiving information about the candidate’s
involvement in corruption schemes (Figueiredo, Hidalgo, & Kasa-
hara, 2011; Pereira & Melo, 2015). In contrast, Ferraz and Finan
(2011) show that audit results revealing potential evidence of
corruption negatively impact on the chances of reelection for
municipal governments, with the results strongest in municipal-
ities with independent media. However, the negative electoral
reprecussions for potential corrupt ofﬁcials are less pronounced
in those municipalities that receive a signiﬁcant amount of fed-
eral transfers (Brollo, Nannicini, Perotti, & Tabellini, 2013). In sum,
the evidence does not indicate that the Brazilian voters effectively
punish corrupt politicians in the voting booth.
While these two examples demonstrate how corruption in
Brazil can resemble a collective action problem, the fact that
these two schemes (along with many others) have been uncovered
and that enforcement ofﬁcials have taken legal action against the
implicated parties suggests that something is working in Brazil’s
anti-corruption system. Not long ago, researchers were trying to
provide explanations for the lack for enforcement of Brazilian anti-
corruption laws (Taylor & Buranelli, 2007), andmore recently some
of these same researchers have been seeking explanations for the
country’s success (Prac¸a & Taylor, 2014). These developments can-
not be attributed to one single factor, but a number of variables
seem to have contributed to these positive outcomes. First, there
has been a signiﬁcant, albeit incremental, improvement in person-
nel and resources allocated to a number of key institutions, such as
the Brazilian Federal police (Power & Taylor, 2011). Second, these
incremental changes may have gone unnoticed to the average citi-
zen, as the changes were so small and discrete that failed to feature
in newspaper headlines. But a cumulative set of small incremental
changes over a signiﬁcant period of timehas generated a signiﬁcant
end result (Prac¸a & Taylor, 2014). Third, some of these incremen-
tal changes, althoughmade independently, created self-reinforcing
mechanisms. This, in turn, generated positive feedback loops that
reinforced a virtuous cycle (Ibid.).
Without questioning the valuable contributions these various
factors may have made to Brazil’s recent anti-corruption efforts,
we believe that there is yet another variable in this mix: institu-
tional multiplicity. Brazil has simultaneously empowered multiple
institutions with the authority to monitor, investigate, and punish
corruption. Rather than the product of a meticulous and coherent
strategy designed by a single architect, this multifaceted approach
seems to have been the result of independent and uncoordinated
efforts from different actors that were separately trying to improve
theaccountability systemindifferentways.Nevertheless, the result
is a system of reactive institutional multiplicity that appears to
have been able to achieve some measure of success in tackling the
collective action problem of corruption in the country.
Focusing ﬁrst on oversight, the National Court of Accounts
(Tribunal de Contas da União, TCU) functions as Brazil’s leading gov-
ernment audit institution, andeachyear, its staff of 2400employees
inspects roughly 3000 annual ﬁnancial reports from various gov-
ernment ofﬁces and processes several thousands of cases involving
the employment and retirement of civil servants (Speck, 2011).
However, after multiple scandals in the 1990s (e.g., Collorgate, São
Paulo Regional Labor Court (TRT)) highlighted numerous proce-
dural and institutional deﬁciencies in the TCU, in 2001 President
Cardoso established an internal affairs division in the executive
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branch which ultimately became the Ofﬁce of Comptroller Gen-
eral of the Union (Controladoria-Geral da União, CGU). Responsible
for internal accountability within the executive branch, the CGU
has enhanced its role in monitoring public expenditures through
its Random Audits Program (Programa de Fiscalizac¸ão a partir de
Sorteios Públicos) which uses a lottery to randomly select munici-
palities whose books are then audited to oversee the use of federal
transfers.
Notably, the establishment of the CGU did not formally affect
the authority of the TCU or its activities but rather merely cre-
ated another institutional pathway to monitor the management of
public funds.However, theperformance records for these two insti-
tutions suggest that institutional multiplicity may have induced
improvements. Speciﬁcally, since the CGU was created in 2001
and strengthened in 2006, the TCU has become notably more
active. The Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of
the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) Com-
mittee (2012, p. 20) notes that, between 2006 and 2010, the total
number of processes initiated and pursued by the TCU (including
audits, inspections, consultations, and complaints) rose from 6135
to 8019.
Without positing a direct causal connection between these two
events, their temporal proximity suggests that institutional mul-
tiplicity and the mechanisms through which it may affect the
operation of accountability institutions deserves further investiga-
tion. Moreover, even if a causal connection between institutional
multiplicity and improved performance could be established, the
precise forces that induced both institutions to improve their
performance are unclear. For instance, inter-institutional competi-
tion may have ultimately improved institutional efﬁciency (Heller,
2003), or multiplicity may have simply generated fruitful cooper-
ation or enhanced complementarities between CGU and TCU. This
also deserves further investigation.
Over the past decade, Brazil has also incorporated institutional
multiplicity to investigate suspected corruption. For many years,
responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of corrupt-
related offenses primarily lay with the Federal Public Prosecutors’
Ofﬁce. Questions concerning the investigative capacity of the police
led the Brazilian government in 1992 to allocate responsibility over
corruption cases to public prosecutors, who were then expected to
investigate and bring civil suits to the judiciary. While the MPF was
very active in investigating and bringing civil suits, the judiciary
(especially state courts) proved slow (or unwilling) to impose sanc-
tions. However, amidst concerted efforts undertaken at the end of
the Cardoso administration (1995-2002) and strengthened under
the Lula administration (2003-10) to improve the resources, pro-
fessionalism, and performance of the federal police (Departamento
da Polícia Federal, DPF), the DPF began to consider their mandate to
include the ﬁght against corruption and organized crime (Arantes,
2011).While theMPF retain exclusive authority over the investiga-
tion of civil corruption cases, on criminal cases, the DPF generally
takes the lead, although, as discussed below, often with valuable
assistance frompublicprosecutors.Withan increasedbudget,more
personnel, a newly deﬁned focus on corruption and the use of
catchy names for operations to gain easy publicity, the federal
police have become an increasingly potent force in ﬁghting cor-
ruption in Brazil.
While the empowerment of MPF and the subsequent strength-
ening of DPF suggest a focus on a particular principal at different
points in time, the end result of these measures is two strong insti-
tutions performing investigative functions. And it is notable that
the increase in criminal investigations and operations at the DFP
between 2005 and 2009 has been followed by an increase in civil
investigations initiated by the MPF on corruption and administra-
tive impropriety between 2007 and 2011 (MESICIC, 2012: 27–36).
Although we cannot prove a causal connection, our hypothe-
sis is that the strengthening of the DPF may have had a positive
impact on the MPF’s performance and vice-versa. The DPF’s partic-
ipation in criminal investigations clearly increases the total human
and ﬁnancial resources dedicated to the ﬁght against corruption,
but, moreover, the DPF and MPF seem to have been able to col-
laborate and to complement each other’s work, further enhancing
the quality and quantity of corruption investigations. Notably, the
MPF’s contributions have proven indispensable in numerous crim-
inal investigations, including the Mensalão case which resulted
in the unprecedented sentencing of high-level politicians. Indeed,
according to the Attorney General (Procurador Geral da República),
it would not be possible to prosecute and convict those involved
in the Mensalão case without the investigation conducted by the
public prosecutors’ ofﬁce (Gantois, 2013).
The signiﬁcantprogress associatedwithBrazil’s systemsofover-
sight and investigation (Arantes, 2011; Speck, 2011) in recent
years has not been replicated in its punishment of corrupt actors
(Avritzer, 2011; Filgueiras, 2011; Taylor, 2009). Prado and Carson
(2016) suggest that thisdismalperformancecanbeattributeda lack
of institutional multiplicity: a single and underperforming insti-
tution – the judiciary – has exercised monopolistic authority in
sanctioning corrupt behavior.
If our hypothesis about institutional multiplicity is correct,
however, there seems to be reason to believe that this is about
to change. To circumvent the limits associated with Brazilian
courts, the government is increasingly relying on administrative
sanctions for corruption. Speciﬁcally, the Clean Company Act (Lei
Anti-Corrupc¸ão), enacted in August 2013 to hold legal persons
accountable for both foreign and domestic corruption, allows cases
to be brought in administrative proceedings as well as civil courts,
thus providing a mechanism through which ofﬁcials can circum-
vent the well-known problems that plague the Brazilian judiciary
(Prado, Carson, & Correa, 2016). Whether it will prove effective,
however, remains to be seen.
If our hypothesis about institutional multiplicity in monitoring
and investigation is accurate, however, there are strong reasons to
believe that theAct ismovingpunishment in the rightdirection. The
Act further creates incentives for partieswith knowledge of corrupt
schemes to work with authorities in exchange for reduced penal-
ties. Indeed, in the Petrobrás case, a number people working for
construction companies or for Petrobrás itself who were involved
in the payback scheme of overpriced contracts have agreed to
come forward and collaborate with the investigation in exchange
for leniency in sanctions. Beyond the assistance that cooperation
from parties with direct knowledge of or involvement in corrupt
schemes can provide police and public prosecutors in their inves-
tigations, such leniency provisions also raise the threat of potential
defection and whistleblowing among participants in such illicit
operations. The Act thus addresses the ﬁrst order collective action
problembyprovidingadvantages to “ﬁrstmovers”who takea stand
against corruption while also tackling the second order issue by
creating an alternative means to hold corrupt actors accountable
without threatening the authority or status of the existing sanc-
tioning institution, the judiciary.
By offering this institutional multiplicity hypothesis to explain
Brazil’s recent success, we are not dismissing other potential insti-
tutional arrangements that may have contributed to this change.
So-called institutional “layering” describes a process of gradual
institutional change that occurs as the result of introducing new
rules or creating new organizations without eliminating existing
ones (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). More
speciﬁcally, it comprises “a partial renegotiation of elements of
a given set of institutions while leaving others in place” (Thelen,
2002: 225).
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Recent reforms to Brazil’s administration and treatment of
money-laundering cases provide an example of layering in the cor-
ruption context. Beginning in2003, federal tribunalsweregiven the
option of creating specialized “judicial bancs” (varas especializadas)
to evaluate cases involving suspected money-laundering (CJF Res-
olutions 314/03, 517/06). After showing signiﬁcant results, these
specialized judicial bancs became mandatory for federal appeals
tribunals in 2013 (CJFResolution273/13). The creationof these spe-
cialized judicial bancs represents a case of layering because, while
the reforms added a new element to the system, prosecutors still
cannot choose the forum in which their cases will be heard.
6. Conclusion
Corruption is a complex, secretive activity and therefore
presents unique challenges to accountability institutions. As such,
functional overlap may be the best mechanism to ensure that
corruption, whether entrenched or opportunistic, is ultimately
exposed and sanctioned. Institutionalmultiplicity could reduce the
risk of failures in each step of the corruption accountability pro-
cess, increase the resources available and/or enhance institutional
performance.
Reactive institutional multiplicity offers a solution to combat
corruption that is very much in line with most of the assumptions
and concerns of the collective action framework. Regarding theﬁrst
order collective action problem, it creates separate institutions that
could potentially reduce the costs for those who are more inclined
to engage in principled behavior to deviate from the standard cor-
rupt behavior that prevails in society. As to second order collective
action problems, institutionalmultiplicity allows for the creation of
new institutions without dismantling the existing ones. It is there-
fore less likely to facepolitical resistance.Also, because institutional
multiplicity does not change the way in which existing institutions
operate, it allows for a series of simultaneous and experimental
reforms that could be akin to a multifaceted effort. In addition,
institutional multiplicity disperses the responsibility for ﬁghting
corruption, decreasing the likelihood that one single institution can
be the target of political backlash (in contrast to standalone, cen-
tralized anti-corruption authorities). Last but not least, the creation
of institutional multiplicity may help foster a reform coalition, as it
creates a safe haven for those inclined to ﬁght corruption or to act
in principled ways.
The Brazilian experience seems to provide some evidence to
support these claims, and the recently enacted Clean Company’s
Act could be yet another example of the potential beneﬁts of insti-
tutional multiplicity.
While reactive institutionalmultiplicity canofferbeneﬁts, it also
has a number of potential drawbacks. First, because institutional
overlap implies duplication it can sometimes be associated with
an inefﬁcient allocation of resources, especially in the short term,
and this concern is particularly relevant in low-income develop-
ing countries with scarce ﬁscal resources that struggle to provide
adequate coverage for other societal needs, such as education and
health. Second, in some contexts institutional multiplicity may
engenderdestructive competitionandencourage individuals inone
institution to act in a manner that undermines the efforts of their
counterparts in another institution (Sharkey, 2013). Third, inso-
far as institutional multiplicity increases the number of ofﬁcials
with the power to investigate and punish corruption, there may
be an increased incidence of corruption in the processes of holding
individuals accountable for corruption. For example, institutional
multiplicity may increase the number authorities from multiple
(corrupt) investigation institutionswhoareable toextractbribesby
threatening innocent citizens with false charges. Last but not least,
there are concerns that more informal administrative processes,
especially those involving merging investigative and punishment
functions (as it seems to be the case with deferred prosecution
agreements in the United States application of the FCPA), may vio-
late fundamental principles of a rule of law system (Koehler, 2014).
As Winters (2015) argues, by relying on institutional multi-
plicity, the Brazilian Clean Company Act may confront all these
problems. We acknowledge these risks, but for the reasons pre-
sented above we believe that, in the Brazilian case, investing in
institutional multiplicity is the best strategy. This is not to sug-
gest that all countries facing endemic corruption should adopt this
strategy. Institutionalmultiplicity should be considered in a careful
cost-beneﬁt analysis on a case-by-case basis, taking into consider-
ation the resources, capacities, and policy needs within individual
countries or societies. As such, a strategy of institutional multiplic-
ity should be undertaken only after careful consideration of the
potential beneﬁts and drawbacks, based on the speciﬁc context.
The Brazilian experience in the near future should provide rele-
vant information to test the hypothesis developed here and further
research should help reformers decide how and when to best use
this strategy in the future.
In sum, further research into the conditions under which insti-
tutional multiplicity may generate more beneﬁts than costs would
go a long way in helping reformers in Brazil and in other countries
fruitfully use this arrangement in the future.
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